Deposit Insurance and the Composition of Bank Suspensions in Developing Economies: Lessons from the State Deposit Insurance Experiments of the 1920S by Ching-Yi Chung & Gary Richardson
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND THE COMPOSITION OF BANK SUSPENSIONS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES:
LESSONS FROM THE STATE DEPOSIT INSURANCE EXPERIMENTS OF THE 1920S
Ching-Yi Chung
Gary Richardson
Working Paper 12594
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12594
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
October 2006
We thank John DiNardo, Erik Heitfield, Kris Mitchener, Stergios Skepardas, numerous friends and
colleagues, two anonymous referees, and participants in seminars at the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, the University of California at Riverside, Cal State Fullerton, and the 2003 Cliometrics
Conference for advice, comments, and encouragement. We thank the University of California for financial
support.  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2006 by Ching-Yi Chung and Gary Richardson. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Deposit Insurance and the Composition of Bank Suspensions in Developing Economies: Lessons
from the State Deposit Insurance Experiments of the 1920S
Ching-Yi Chung and Gary Richardson
NBER Working Paper No. 12594
October 2006
JEL No. E42,E65,L1,N1,N14,O16
ABSTRACT
Eight states established deposit insurance systems between 1908 and 1917. All abandoned the systems
between 1921 and 1930. Scholars debate the costs and benefits of these policy experiments. New data
drawn from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors demonstrate that deposit insurance
influenced the composition of bank suspensions in these states. In typical years, suspensions due to
runs fell. Suspensions due to mismanagement rose. During the penultimate year of each system, the
bank failure rate rose to an unsustainable height and the system ceased operations.
Ching-Yi Chung
3151 Social Science Plaza
Department of Economics University of California
Irvine, CA 92612-5100
chingyic@uci.edu
Gary Richardson
Department of Economics
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
and NBER
garyr@uci.edu  1
1. Introduction 
The savings-and-loan debacle of the 1970s and 80s stimulated research on deposit 
insurance. Interest persists because of the institution’s international diffusion during recent 
decades. Recently, the IMF endorsed a form of deposit insurance in its code of best practices 
[Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002 pp. 1377, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2001 p. 3]. The 
desirability of deposit insurance, however, remains controversial, particularly among economists 
who have studied the history of deposit insurance in the United States. 
Between 1908 and 1917, eight states – Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Washington – established deposit insurance systems. 
Within three decades, all discontinued operations. The experiences of these states influenced the 
bankers, scholars, politicians, and pundits who wanted to reform America’s financial system 
after the Great Depression. They believed the state deposit insurance systems had reduced bank 
runs and that a similar nationwide system would protect the nation from banking panics in the 
future. The advocates of deposit insurance won the debate in 1934, when Congress established 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Today, economic historians paint a bleaker picture of 
the state deposit insurance experience. The state systems encouraged risk taking, discouraged 
prudence, and distorted the incentives of bank owners and managers. This moral hazard 
weakened the financial system and raised bank suspension rates [Calomiris 1990 and 1992; 
Alston, Grove, Wheelock 1990; Wheelock 1993; Wheelock and Kumbhakar 1995; Wheelock 
and Wilson 1995; White 1981 and 1983]. The different opinions of those who study deposit 
insurance today and those who analyzed it in the past might arise because those who studied the 
issue then and now employed different methods and sources of evidence, and their particular 
perspectives prevented them from seeing the entire picture.   2
Our essay suggests this is the case. The five following sections substantiate this 
supposition. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and discusses the reasons that states adopted 
deposit insurance. Section 3 describes the data on the causes of bank suspension drawn from the 
archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Section 4 presents grouped logistic 
regressions that show states with deposit insurance experienced banking panics in the years 
immediately preceding the abandonment of those systems. These crises and exogenous economic 
conditions accounted for almost all of the differences in average suspension rates between 
insured and uninsured states. Section 5 presents multinomial logistic regressions indicating that 
deposit insurance influenced the composition of bank suspensions. Deposit insurance reduced 
suspensions due to causes discouraged by deposit insurance (called runs throughout this essay) 
and increased suspensions due to causes exacerbated by the moral hazards of deposit insurance 
(called mismanagement). The magnitudes of these effects were approximately equal. Section 6 
discusses the implications of our estimates. 
During the 1920s, deposit insurance mitigated bank runs and engendered moral hazard. 
These juxtaposed effects roughly balanced each other out. Deposit insurance, in other words, 
altered the composition but not the quantity of bank suspensions. The exception was the 
penultimate year of each deposit insurance regime, when bank suspension rates rose to 
unsustainable levels and the system ceased operation.  
 
2. Current Literature and Past Events 
Scholarly studies of the state deposit insurance systems of the early twentieth century 
address two broad questions. What were the consequences of deposit insurance? Why did some 
states establish deposit insurance systems while others did not?  
Answers to the first question are of two types. Before the Savings and Loan Crisis, the   3
conventional wisdom was that deposit insurance had salutary effects. Insurance reduced runs on 
bank and enhanced the stability of financial intermediation [House Report No. 150, 73
rd 
Congress, 1934]. Insurance encouraged individuals to maintain larger deposit balances, which 
increased the funds available to the financial system as a whole, expanded the amount of credit 
available via unit banks (particularly in rural areas), reduced interest rates, and fostered economic 
activity [Emerson 1934 pp. 241-2; Golembe 1960 pp. 188-9]. 
The Savings and Loan Crisis forced economists to reexamine this issue. Cliometricians 
concluded that deposit insurance subsidized risk-taking. Banks with insured deposits assumed 
more risk than they would have otherwise [Calomiris 1990; Grossman 1992; Wheelock and 
Kumbhakar 1995]. This moral hazard increased the likelihood of suspension for insured state-
chartered banks [Hooks and Robinson 2002; Wheelock 1992]. Membership in deposit insurance 
systems was positively correlated with the rate of bank failures across states and among counties 
within the state of Kansas, even after controlling for factors such as differing levels of 
agricultural distress and aggregate characteristics of banks [Wheelock 1992; Wheelock and 
Wilson 1995]. 
These scholars also wondered why some states had established deposit insurance systems 
while other states did not. Carter Golembe and Eugene White, among others, argue that bankers 
lobbied for the establishment of deposit insurance to preserve the status quo, protect unit bankers 
from competition, and insulate managers and owners from the ill-effects of erroneous decisions. 
Bankers wanted such protection. Those whose negligence or malfeasance led to the collapse of 
banks faced suits from creditors and prosecution for defalcation. Owners of bank shares 
possessed double liability. Deposit insurance limited exposure to such claims. In other words, 
deposit insurance was not adopted in the 1920s to promote the public good, but to serve interests   4
of bank owners and managers [Golembe 1960; White 1983]. 
White [1983 pp. 198-204] presents econometric and qualitative evidence supporting this 
political economy argument. States with laws favoring unit banks – such as low minimum capital 
requirements and laws prohibiting branch banking – were more likely to establish deposit 
insurance systems. Unit-banking states whose legislatures did not pass deposit insurance 
legislation usually considered such provisions. In several instances, proposals for deposit 
insurance failed by narrow margins. States with laws favoring larger banks – such as high capital 
requirements and permissive statutes towards branch banking – did not adopt deposit insurance 
and seldom seriously considered doing so. 
Curiously, White’s regressions reveal no correlation between the failure rate of state (or 
national) banks and the adoption of deposit insurance. Figure 1 reveals why. Between 1908 and 
1918, the decade when adoption was popular, suspensions rates in states that did and did not 
adopt deposit insurance were low and similar. Statistical tests of means and variances cannot 
distinguish the two distributions. This is true for both state and national banks, as Figure 2 shows. 
The similarity of suspension rates before 1920 partially alleviates an econometric concern: that 
states with higher suspension rates adopted deposit insurance and that the endogeniety of the 
adoption decision biases upwards estimates of the effects of deposit insurance on suspension 
rates. The pre-insurance experiences of the various states probably did not teach legislators in 
some states that their banking systems were inherently vulnerable and thus needed deposit 
insurance and in other states that their banking systems were inherently stable and thus in no 
need of depositor protection.
1 
Of course, politicians may have been forward looking. Legislators in states that adopted 
                                                 
1   By inherently more vulnerable, we mean that the effect of adverse economic shocks would have been larger in 
   5
deposit insurance may have believed that their financial systems were more vulnerable to shocks 
than the financial systems in other states. It is unlikely that they forecast the magnitude of the 
shocks that would strike their economies in the next decade. The Dustbowl drought, World War 
I, the realignment of the international financial system, the expansion of agriculture during the 
1910s, and the contraction of agriculture during the 1920s surprised most people. Yet, if the 
banking systems in states that adopted deposit insurance were inherently more vulnerable to 
those shocks than were the banking systems in other states, estimates of the effect of deposit 
insurance on bank suspension rates might be biased upwards. 
Recent research on the political economy of the agricultural frontier suggests such 
concerns may be misplaced.
2 Gary Libecap and Zeynap Hansen [2003] conclude that competition 
to attract settlers propelled politics along the western edge of settlement at the turn of the 
twentieth century [note that six of the eight deposit-insurance states lay along the agricultural 
frontier]. The western states adopted an array of fiscal and regulatory policies designed to attract 
migrants. One was deposit insurance, which encouraged the establishment of small banks in rural 
areas and facilitated settlement. Farmers could not prosper in regions lacking access to credit. 
These policies encouraged the expansion in the number of banks, the overexpansion of 
agricultural production, and eventually degraded the topsoil over wide regions, leading to the 
Dustbowl of the 1920s and 30s. In this vision of the past, a regression of suspension rates on 
deposit insurance would capture both the direct and indirect effects of the insurance systems. The 
direct effects included the influence of insurance on the behavior of bankers and depositors. The 
indirect effects included the effect of farm credit on the expansion of agriculture, the erosion of 
topsoil, and the ability of farmers to earn a living.  
                                                 
the inherently vulnerable jurisdiction regardless of whether or not the jurisdiction adopted deposit insurance.   6
 
3. Data 
Our data come from archival and published sources. The archival evidence illuminates 
the causes of bank suspensions. It comes from the Central Subject Files of the Federal Reserve 
System. This section discusses when, where, why, and how the Board of Governors collected 
this information; how we processed the materials; and issues important for interpreting empirical 
work based upon this new and unique source. The previously published information illuminates 
aggregate economic trends and shocks. Descriptions appear later in this section and in the 
appendix. 
During the latter half of the 1920s, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors embarked on 
an ambitious project: the creation of standard statistical reports for all banks operating in the 
United States, both members of the Federal Reserve System and nonmembers, national and state, 
public and private. Different divisions tackled portions of the problem. The Committee on 
Branch, Group, and Chain Banking examined the issue of bank suspensions. 
In 1930, the committee began a retrospective study. The goal was to discern the cause of 
every bank suspension in the United States during the preceding ten years. The plan was to 
create a form on which relevant information could be compiled. This information included the 
bank’s identity, characteristics (national, state, member of the Federal Reserve, town, county, 
etc.), financial condition on the day of suspension and previous dates (assets, liabilities, surplus 
and profits, paid-in capital, etc.), a description of the aftermath of suspension (reopened, merged, 
liquidated, etc.) and financial details of the resolution, including the portion of the assets 
recovered and repaid to creditors of various types. A facsimile of a portion of the form appears in 
the data appendix. For every bank known to have suspended operations between 1 January 1921 
                                                 
2   John Wallis communicated this conjecture to the authors at the 2003 Cliometrics Conference.   7
and 31 December 1929, the Committee filled in as much information as it could from records 
available at the Board of Governors. Then, it sent copies of the forms to the Federal Reserve 
District Banks. Accompanying memos instructed districts to check the information entered by 
the committee, add information available in district records, fill out new forms for any suspended 
banks missed by the committee, and forward the forms to the appropriate Federal Reserve branch 
bank. The branch banks followed the same procedure, and then forwarded the forms to state 
banking authorities. The state regulators repeated the process, and whenever possible, solicited 
opinions from examiners and receivers who handled the case at hand. The goal was to get the 
facts from objective individuals with intimate knowledge of each institution and to check and 
recheck the information as the forms traveled down to the lowest levels of the regulatory 
hierarchy and back up to the Board of Governors. To speed their work, clerks recopied 
information of interest from original documents onto large columnar pads. Each row indicated 
the cause of failure of an individual bank. 
Our data comes from those spreadsheets. The source has advantages. The spreadsheets 
formed the foundation for a series of tables appearing in the committee’s report Bank 
Suspensions in the United States, and thus, are consistent with the data often used by economic 
historians to study this issue. Our source also has disadvantages. The summary spreadsheets 
indicate only the state, legal status, date of suspension, and cause of suspension. Lack of bank-
specific explanatory variables, obviously, influences our analysis. The extant explanatory 
variables are aggregated at the state and national level.  
  To overcome this mismatch and prepare the evidence for analysis, we aggregate the data 
on the causes of suspension to the state level. We lose no information in this process. Our 
dependent variable (cause of suspension) is measured at the individual level (i.e. for each bank).   8
But, the independent variables are measured at the group level (i.e. for each state). In these 
circumstances, the logit and multinomial logit models appropriate for the study of individual 
bank suspensions are mathematically equivalent to grouped logit and multinomial models used to 
study state-level suspension rates where the observations are weighted by the number of banks in 
each state suspending operations due to each cause. 
We aggregate the dependent variable in the following manner. We categorized 
suspensions into three classes. The first is suspensions due to reasons discouraged by deposit 
insurance, which we often refer to as runs. The second is suspensions due to reasons encouraged 
by deposit insurance, which we often refer to as mismanagement. The third is suspensions due to 
neither reason. Summing for each state and year the number of suspensions in each class yields 
our dependent variables. The computation is complicated by one consideration. A single 
suspension could be attributed to multiple causes. Attributions occasionally include multiple 
primary and multiple secondary causes. We weight all primary causes equally. We weight all 
secondary causes equally. We place more weight on primary than secondary causes. The weights 
sum to one. The results reported in this paper weigh primary causes four times as much as 
secondary causes. We check the robustness of that assumption by varying the weight of the 
secondary causes from zero to equality with primary causes. The variation does not change our 
results.  
The definitions above clarify the dependent variable that we employ in Section 5. The 
dependent variable that we employ in Section 4 is the log odds ratio of the aggregate state bank 
suspension rate. We take this information from the Report of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
Figure 1 displays state-bank suspension rates averaged for states with (DI) and without deposit 
insurance (Non DI). It also indicates the years that states adopted and departed deposit insurance.   9
Our explanatory variables also come from published sources. Details appear in the data 
appendix.  
A categorical variable indicates whether states possessed deposit insurance. Between 
1907 and 1917, Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas, Nebraska, Mississippi, South Dakota, North Dakota, 
and Washington established such systems. All abandoned these regulatory regimes between 1921 
and 1930. The systems were similar. All were funded via small assessments imposed on covered 
deposits. Most imposed additional capital requirements on participating financial institutions. A 
significant difference existed in only one dimension. The systems in Kansas, South Dakota, and 
Washington were voluntary. Banks could choose whether to join. The systems in the other states 
were compulsory.
3 
The national-bank suspension rate proxies for economic forces influencing the fates of 
state banks. The national-bank suspension rate is useful for several reasons. First, national banks 
neither participated in statewide deposit-insurance schemes nor operated under state banking 
regulations. Changes in national banking laws did not coincide with changes in state deposit-
insurance legislation. Second, interstate branch banking did not exist. National bank suspensions 
were discrete events located in particular states. Third, national banks operated under a 
nationwide regulatory system with a single, national currency. Identical rules applied in all 
states. This common regulatory regime insures that differences in national-bank suspension rates 
across states reflect differences in the economic forces that influenced banks’ fates. Fourth, the 
economic forces that affected the fates of national banks also affected the fates of state banks. 
                                                 
3   In Texas, banks had to choose between two compulsory systems. Banks could either join the Depositors Guaranty 
Fund, where they paid in annually 1 percent of their average daily deposits, or the Bond Security System, where 
they posted a bond of indemnity equal to their capital with a surety company.  Even though banks had the 
freedom to choose one of the two plans, they do not have a choice between joining and not joining the system. 
Hence, the classification of Texas could go either way.   10
Neither type could survive sizeable losses on loans or incessant withdrawals of deposits. Both 
types had to earn profits. Revenues depended on interest earned on investments and rates of loan 
repayments. Costs depended on rents, wages, and interest paid to depositors. Fluctuations in 
those factors influenced the bottom line of all banks. So, fluctuations in suspension rates of 
national banks reveal a great deal about changes in economic conditions affecting state banks. 
Fifth, direct information on general economic conditions does not exist. National income 
accounts begin in 1929. Estimates for earlier periods are in dispute. Only scattered data exists on 
income, investment, employment, consumption, and business conditions at the state level. Most 
extant evidence comes from highly volatile sectors that surely interacted endogenously with bank 
behavior. Even that information is sparse and imprecise. The national-bank suspension rate 
serves as a substitute for that information. It is a useful measure of state-specific conditions, 
provides a base line for interstate comparisons, and reflects the magnitude of shocks affecting the 
financial system in each state. 
The national-bank suspension rate also enters the regression directly. Our data reveals 
that failures of national banks often directly affected state banks in their communities. National 
banks served as correspondents of state banks. The suspension of national bank correspondents, 
particularly when unexpected, caused difficulties for downstream state institutions. The state 
banks lost their links to the wider financial system and portions of their legal reserves. They had 
to suspend operations. In addition, the suspension of national banks appears on some occasions 
to have sparked withdrawals from and even runs on state banks in the vicinity. The failure of 
national banks may have signaled to depositors the possibility of problems affecting the entire 
banking system. 
Figure 2 displays the national-bank suspension rates averaged for states with (DI) and   11
without (Non DI) deposit insurance. Comparing Figures 1 and 2 reveals important patterns. 
State-bank suspension rates in insured states exceeded those in uninsured states. National-bank 
suspension rates in insured states also exceed those in uninsured states. So did other measures of 
business and agricultural distress. These patterns suggest that differences in the fates of state 
banks between insured and uninsured states were due in part or in whole to differences in 
economic conditions. 
The national-bank suspension rate may understate one significant shock afflicting the 
grain-growing regions of Middle America where there were many insured states. State banks 
tended to have close links to local communities. Many loaned large portions of their portfolios to 
agricultural interests. Farmers were the predominant holders of loans. National banks had closer 
links to the business and financial communities. Their portfolios contained more industrial loans, 
interbank deposits, and financial securities. Fluctuations in agricultural conditions probably had a 
greater impact on state banks. 
To account for the differential impact of agricultural shocks, we employ two types of 
evidence. First, the price of grain reveals returns from sales of crops. International grain markets 
developed at the end of the 19
th century. Supply and demand in the world as a whole determined 
the prices of popular cereals such as maize, oats, and wheat. Aggregate supply depended upon 
planting decisions of farmers throughout the world as well as the vagaries of the weather all 
around the globe. Demand fluctuated along with demographic trends and tariff barriers. Those 
fluctuations were exogenous to the banking systems of individual states. The data appendix 
describes our sources for the prices of maize, oats, and wheat, the crops that comprised the 
preponderance of produce in the grain-growing regions of the United States. 
Second, climatic conditions influenced yields of fields. Yields influenced farmers’   12
profits, repayment rates of agricultural loans, and the solvency of state banks. Previous scholars 
measure yields directly, since data is abundant. We do not follow in their footsteps because 
yields were not exogenous. Yields per acre, per worker, and on aggregate depended upon choices 
of what and how much to plant on what type of land. Those choices varied according to credit 
conditions, the willingness of bankers to extend loans on certain types of crops, and the ability of 
farmers to diversify against risks. All of those factors depended upon decisions of financial 
institutions. The component of yields that was undoubtedly exogenous to such decisions was 
climatic conditions. An excellent indicator of the relevant information is the Palmer Drought 
Index. The Department of Agriculture compiled the index from data on temperature and 
precipitation at land stations scattered throughout each state. The Department of Agriculture uses 
it as an indicator of conditions influencing yields of grain fields. We employ it because it is the 
longest running consistently calculated series available. Details appear in the data appendix. 
 
4. Grouped Logistic Methods and Results 
  A natural way of analyzing the impact of deposit insurance systems exists. It is to 
compare rates of bank suspensions in states that adopted deposit insurance and states that did not. 
States that adopted deposit insurance are treatment states. States that did not are control states. 
The empirical task is to compare suspension rates in treatment and control states, before and after 
shifts in policy regimes, while controlling for exogenous forces that influenced suspension rates 
and the endogeneity of policy changes. This section undertakes that task.  
  Since the phenomena of interest are bank suspensions, which are discreet events, and the 
independent variables are measured at the state level, the appropriate analytical framework is a   13
grouped logit model where the groups are the states.
4 In this framework, the following formula 
describes state-bank suspension rates:  
(1)  ( ) it SSR s its s its it it it SSR it it D A DI NSR Y F SSR , ε δ ϕ γ ψ φ + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ λ Z  
where SSRit is the state-bank suspension rate in state i in year t. Yit is an index of all exogenous 
variables that influence state-bank suspension rates.
5 NSRit is the national-bank suspension rate in 
state i in year t. Note that some specifications also include the square of the national-bank 
suspension rate. DIit is a dummy variable indicating the existence of deposit insurance in state i 
in year t. The symbols ￿SSR, ψ, and ￿ represent coefficients on Yit, NSRit, and DIit respectively. 
All of our regressions include constant terms, which for brevity we exclude from the formulas 
above and below. Zit is a vector of additional explanatory variables, principally agricultural 
prices, climatic conditions, state bank reserve requirements, state branch banking laws, and 
region, state, and year fixed effects. ￿ is a vector of coefficients for those variables.  
  Aits  = 1 if deposit insurance is adopted in year t - s 
       = 0 otherwise 
 
  Dits   = 1 if deposit insurance is abandoned in year t - s      
        = 0 otherwise 
 
  s   = policy lead and lag indicator  
= {-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3} 
 
The set of effects ￿s and ￿s controls for shocks occurring around the time of policy 
changes and the endogeneity of regulatory decisions. This control is a crucial consideration 
because states may have adopted deposit insurance during economic expansions and/or 
abandoned deposit insurance after experiencing higher than normal suspension rates. Both 
                                                 
4   In the absence of bank specific right-hand side variables, logits run on individual observations are mathematically 
equivalent to logits run on the grouped data. 
5   Assuming Yit as an index rather than a vector of all exogenous variables influencing state-bank suspension rates 
simplifies the algebra without altering the analysis.   14
situations may generate spurious correlations between policy regimes and suspension rates. So 
can all other circumstances when temporary shocks to suspension rates influenced policy 
decisions concerning deposit insurance. The set of effects ￿s and ￿s reveals these correlations 
and distinguishes them from the typical impact of deposit insurance. The dummy variables that 
determine these effects, Aits and Dits (for adoption of deposit insurance and departure from 
deposit insurance respectively), extend three years before changes in deposit insurance regimes 
and lag three years thereafter. Three years should have been long enough for shocks to induce 
legislatures to change laws or for legal changes to take effect.
6 
The national-bank suspension rate enters the regression directly as an exogenous 
explanatory variable, and indirectly, as a substitute for the unobserved index of exogenous 
explanatory variables. The national-bank suspension rate is itself a function of those variables.  
(2)  ( ) it NSR NSR it it Y F NSR , ε φ + =  
where φ NSR represents the influence of the unobserved variable on the national-bank suspension 
rate. Inverting (2), solving for Y, substituting the result into (1), and simplifying yields (3). 
(3)   ( ) it s its s its it it it it it D A DI NSR NSR F F SSR ε δ ϕ γ ϕ φ + + + + + + = ∑ ∑
− λ Z ) (
1  
where  NSR SSR φ φ φ / ≡  and  it NSR it SSR it , , φε ε ε − = . The formula for εit indicates that correlations 
could exist between the error term and the independent variables. Estimates of coefficients could 
be biased and inconsistent. A methodological appendix examines this issue. It employs 
econometric theory and historical information about unestimable variances to show that our 
regressions might slightly overestimate the impact of deposit insurance. Corrections to the 
problem based on instrumental variables and the method of group averages indicate that the bias, 
                                                 
6   Our method of controlling for shocks around the time of policy changes is based on the method of DiNardo and 
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which appears to be positive as theory suggests, is small and insignificant in practice.
7 
Now, denote all of the explanatory variables with the matrix Xit. Denote all of the 
corresponding coefficients with the vectorβ . Substituting these denotations into equation (3) 
yields a shorthand that will be useful later. 
(3´) ) ( it it it F SSR ε β + = X  
F is the logistic function,  
) exp( 1
) exp(
) (
⋅⋅ +
⋅⋅
= ⋅⋅ F
 
Thus, equation (3) represents a standard logit model estimated on grouped data. Its linear form 
is:  
it it s its s its it it
it
it
it
it D A DI NSR
NSR
NSR
SSR
SSR
ε δ ϕ γ ψ φ + + + + + + ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
= ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
− ∑ ∑ λ Z
1
ln
1
ln  
We estimate the linear form with weighted least squares. The weights equal Nit *  SSRit (1-SSRit), 
where Nit is the number of state banks in state i in year t.
8 
Table 1 presents grouped logit estimations for the period 1909 to 1929. Column (1) 
reveals the basic correlation between deposit insurance and the log odds of state-bank suspension 
rates. On average, more banks suspended operations in places with deposit insurance than places 
without those policies. Predicted values of the dependent variable clearly reveal this. The 
predicted suspension rate in states with deposit insurance is 5.34 percent. The predicted 
suspension rate in states without deposit insurance is 3.72 percent. Column (2) shows that 
business conditions account for much of that difference. The log odds of the national-bank 
                                                 
Lemieux [1992]. 
7   Here, our methods and results resemble those of Mitchener [2002]. 
8   The standard errors that we report have been calculated using the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance. 
An appendix discusses the methods that we used to control for shocks common to groups and/or across time.    16
suspension rate is practically and statistically significant. The coefficient on deposit insurance 
falls by four-fifths and ceases to be statistically significant. The difference in predicted 
suspension rates falls to a similar extent. This makes sense. National-bank suspension rates 
tended to be higher in places with deposit insurance. Fluctuations in national-bank suspension 
rates coincided with fluctuations in state-bank suspension rates. The correlation accounts for a 
large portion of interstate differences in suspension rates. Together, columns (1) and (2) replicate 
the conventional academic wisdom. They show that on average, state-bank suspension rates in 
places with deposit insurance exceeded those in places without deposit insurance and most of the 
difference was due to economic conditions. 
Column (3) includes variables that alter the conventional conclusion. The dummy 
variables Aits and Dits yield the effects ￿its and ￿its. All of the former are statistically 
insignificant, except for ￿it,0 and ￿it,1. These are usually positive and significant. This pattern 
indicates that state bank suspension rates did not differ between states before the adoption of 
deposit insurance, and thus, that the decision to establish an insurance system was probably not 
based on historical experience. State bank suspension rates rose briefly when states established 
insurance systems and then returned to pre-insurance levels, perhaps because moral hazard 
altered the incentives of marginal banks and induced them to fail. All of the later are statistically 
insignificant, except for ￿it,-1 and ￿it,1, which reveal that state-bank suspensions surged the year 
before states abandoned deposit insurance and the crisis continued at an abated level until the 
following year. The coefficient on ￿it,-1 explains the correlation between deposit insurance and 
suspension rates observed by previous scholars. The correlation exists because states abandoned 
deposit insurance after experiencing higher-than-normal suspension rates. This result is robust. 
Changes in the specification do not alter it. The same is not true for the coefficient ￿it,1. Its   17
standard error rises rapidly under different assumptions, such as altering starting and ending 
dates (this is apparent in the next table). The coefficient on deposit insurance itself yields the key 
conclusion. Its standard error is large relative to the coefficient. Standard statistical tests cannot 
distinguish it from zero. Its sign is negative, suggesting deposit insurance reduced state-bank 
suspension rates during normal years, if it had any effect. 
Columns (4) and (5) test various aspects of our specification. All control for excluded 
explanatory variables. Column (4) includes crop prices, climatic conditions, year and region 
fixed effects, and interactions between the presence of deposit insurance and measures of 
macroeconomic distress (e.g. the national bank suspension rate). We do not report the 
coefficients on these control variables, since their magnitudes do not alter our conclusions, and 
their size and significance varies depending on the specification. They do add information to the 
regression. They reduce the standard errors of other variables including NSRit, probably because 
the former contains information lacking in the latter. Agricultural conditions had differential 
impacts on state and national banks. The F-statistic on the inclusion of agricultural and climatic 
variables always exceeds the significant level with one revealing exception. When the 
regressions are restricted to agricultural states, they become insignificant in statistical and 
practical terms. The deposit insurance – macroeconomic distress interaction terms are positive, 
suggesting that economic downturns raised bank suspension rates more in insured than uninsured 
states, which Alston et al interpret as a symptom of moral hazard at work, but are statistically 
insignificant in this (and most other) specifications.
9 
Column (5) restricts attention to states with deposit insurance and their immediate 
neighbors. This exercise fits well with our quasi-experimental framework. The economies of 
                                                 
9   These variables resemble those pioneered by Alston, Grove, Wheelock 1994.   18
deposit insurance states closely resembled those of their neighbors. Agriculture and unit banks 
dominated both. Column (5) also refines the indicator for geographic fixed effects. Dummy 
variables are now included for each state. These dummies capture state-specific economic 
conditions as well as design features of deposit-insurance systems unique to each state. These 
changes have little influence on the result. The null hypothesis that the coefficient on deposit 
insurance equals zero cannot be rejected. Difference-in-difference estimates (for brevity not 
reported) yield similar results. They control for state-level fixed effects and reveal patterns that 
substantiate our suppositions. Changes in economic conditions were highly correlated with 
changes in bank suspension rates. Changes in deposit insurance regimes were not. 
Column (6) substitutes an instrumental variable for the log odds of the national bank 
suspension rate. The instrument equals 1 for observations where the log odds exceeds its median 
and –1 for all other observations. The inclusion of the instrument does not alter the signs and 
significance levels of the key variables. This invariance indicates that correlations among shocks 
to national- and state-bank suspension rates do not distort our estimates. Additional regressions 
employing the method of group averages on the top and bottom thirds and top and bottom 
quartiles of the national bank suspension rate support this supposition. So do regressions also 
employing instruments for the national bank suspension rate and its square. 
Column (7) accounts for the endogeniety of deposit insurance via two stage least squares. 
The first stage estimates the likelihood that each state possessed deposit insurance. The 
independent variables in this probit are the log of the national bank suspension rate, the Palmer 
drought index and its square, and an array of state characteristics such as farm size and proximity 
to the agricultural frontier that influenced the types the patterns of legislation in those states (see 
Libecap and Hansen 2003 for details). The second stage employs the predicted values from the   19
first stage in place of the actual values. The results are consistent with our other estimates. So are 
the results of similar regressions employing as the first stage White’s models of states’ decisions 
to adopt deposit insurance [White 1983 pp. 197-204]. Thus, controlling for endogeneity of the 
policy regime in this manner does not alter our conclusions. 
Our results seem robust to the inclusion of endogenous variables, such as the deposit-base 
of the average bank, or the average capital-asset ratio, or the average size of agricultural loans, 
which appeared in previous papers on this topic. We have included such measures in various 
versions of our regressions. They reduce the coefficient on deposit insurance, which one should 
expect and which is consistent with our claims. We do not include those regressions in our tables 
because they do not change our conclusions.  
Our results do not change when one considers characteristics of the various deposit-
insurance regimes. We have rerun all of our regressions with dummies distinguishing voluntary 
and compulsory systems. That was the principal difference among the different schemes. In 
every regression, the dummies for voluntary and compulsory insurance have the same signs and 
significance levels.
10 Tests for equality of coefficients never reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are the same. Tests for the equality of predicted suspension rates yield the same 
result.  
Table 2 replicates these results for the period 1921 to 1929. This exercise is essential. It 
provides a baseline to which we can compare the multinomial estimates in the next section, 
where we must restrict our analysis to the 1920s, because data on the causes of bank suspensions 
                                                 
10  In our regressions, the voluntary and involuntary systems appear identical. There are several possible reasons 
why. First, all systems were voluntary in a sense. State banks could opt out of deposit insurance by changing to a 
national charter. Second, the voluntary systems ceased operating before the involuntary systems. Thus, time 
dummy variables (and all other variables correlated with time) may obscure differences between the two types of 
systems. Third, dividing the DI systems into voluntary and involuntary groups reduces the number of 
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exists only for that period. Column (1) reveals the basic correlation between deposit insurance 
and state-bank suspension rates. Suspension rates in states with deposit insurance averaged 6.40 
percent. Suspension rates in states without deposit insurance averaged 3.81percent. The 
difference, 2.59 percent, is greater than for the longer period (in Table 1) because the crises that 
induced departures from deposit insurance occurred during the 1920s. Columns (2) through (7) 
show the correlation between deposit insurance and state bank suspension rates diminishes or 
disappears after accounting for economic conditions and the endogeniety of policy decisions. 
These estimates can be compared to our multinomial estimates, which cover the same period. 
Tables 1 and 2 substantiate a simple but significant supposition. The stylized fact 
emphasized by earlier authors - that states with deposit insurance had higher suspension rates 
than states without – only applies to the penultimate years of each deposit insurance system. In 
typical years, suspension rates in insured and uninsured states were statistically 
indistinguishable, after controlling for differences in economic conditions. In the year before 
each state abandoned its deposit insurance system, which we often refer to as the ‘crisis’ year, 
however, suspension rates significantly exceeded average levels. This suggests that deposit 
insurance had little effect on aggregate bank suspension rates during good times. Aggregate 
effects are apparent only during crises so severe that states abandoned deposit insurance in the 
subsequent year.  
Table 3 reinforces this result. The top half of the table examines our 1909 to 1929 
estimates. The rows report average predicted state-bank suspension rates. The columns refer to 
specifications (3) through (6) from the tables above. For each specification, the result is the 
same. The insured-state suspension rate resembles the uninsured-state rate except during the year 
                                                 
observations in each by roughly half and raises the standard errors accordingly. The sample sizes may be too 
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preceding departure. A two-sample test of means fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
insured and uninsured rates are identical. A two-sample test of means rejects the hypothesis that 
the uninsured rate equals the suspension rate in insured states during years preceding departure. 
The bottom half of the table examines 1921 to 1929. The results remain the same. The 
suspension rate for insured states during normal years resembles the suspension rate in uninsured 
states. But, the suspension rate in insured states exceeds the suspension rate in uninsured states 
during crisis years. Specification (5), which is our most robust regression, illuminates this point. 
The insured and uninsured suspension rates are statistically indistinguishable and much smaller 
than the suspension rate during the crises preceding the collapse of deposit insurance. 
Figures 3 and 4 summarize our grouped logistic regressions. Figure 3 presents average 
state bank suspension rates (as in Figure 1) with one difference. The deposit insurance average 
no longer includes the observation for the year before each state abandoned deposit insurance. 
For example, since Washington abandoned deposit insurance in 1921, the deposit insurance 
average for 1920 no longer includes the observation for Washington. Excluding these ‘crisis’ 
years illuminates a pattern. In insured states, suspension rates of state and national banks in the 
insured states fluctuated in tandem (e.g. compare Figure 3 to Figure 2). Figure 4 controls for 
those patterns as well as for differences in agricultural conditions and for the ‘crisis’ preceding 
the demise of each deposit insurance system. The figure plots predicted values from regression 
(4) in Table 2 for deposit insurance states after for each state setting the values of their 
agricultural prices, drought index, and national bank suspension rates equal to their eastern 
neighbors and after setting the dummy variables for leads and lags of departures from deposit 
insurance equal to zero. These predictions lie close to the average of suspension rates for 
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uninsured states. The hypothesis that the means and standard deviations of the two series are 
identical cannot be rejected at the 5percent or 1percent confidence levels. The peaks and troughs 
differ slightly. The difference arises because the group of uninsured states contains observations 
from dozens of states on the eastern and western seaboards, where the pattern of suspensions 
differed from those in the cattle and grain economies in the center of the United States. 
 
5. Multinomial Logistic Methods and Results 
The grouped logistic framework has a natural extension to data concerning the causes of 
bank suspensions. The causes fall into three categories: those discouraged by deposit insurance, 
abbreviated runs; those encouraged by deposit insurance, abbreviated mismanagement; and those 
orthogonal to deposit insurance, abbreviated neither. We begin our analysis by specifying a 
system of equations whose coefficients ￿ 
neither, ￿ 
runs, and ￿ 
mismanagement correspond to those 
categories.  
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The system is unidentified. It lacks enough information to simultaneously estimate the three 
vectors of coefficients. Solving this problem requires an identifying assumption. We employ the 
typical assumption, that ￿
neither = 0. Then, system (3) becomes system (3￿) 
 (3a´)  ( )
ent mismanagem
it
runs
it e e SSR
neither
it
B X B X + + = 1 1 
(3b´)  ( )
ent mismanagem
it
runs
it
runs
it e e e SSR
runs
it
B X B X B X + + = 1 
(3c´)  ( )
ent mismanagem
it
runs
it
ent mismanagem
it e e e SSR
ent mismanagem
it
B X B X B X + + = 1   23
Dividing (3b') and (3c') by (3a') and taking natural logarithms yields the log-odds ratios 
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In (4), the coefficients ￿ 
runs and ￿ 
mismanagement capture the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and the composition of bank suspensions. We estimate these coefficients with 
maximum likelihood via the Newton-Raphson method. 
  Table 4 presents our estimates. Column (1) contains the basic correlations. The share of 
bank suspensions due to runs was lower in states with deposit insurance than in states without 
such systems. The share of suspensions due to mismanagement was higher in states with deposit 
insurance than in states without such systems. When national-bank suspension rates rose, the 
share of state-bank suspensions due to runs increased.
11 When national-bank suspension rates 
rose, the share of state-bank suspensions attributed to mismanagement fell. The latter correlation 
stems from three facts. During good times, mismanagement was the preponderant cause of state-
bank suspensions. During bad times, banks failed for reasons other then their own incompetence, 
although mismanagement remained a common contributing cause. Our index weights 
contributing causes less than principal causes. The sign of the coefficient merely reflects that 
fact. The first two correlations have implications that are clearer. Deposit insurance increased 
suspensions due to mismanagement. This increase suggests the moral hazard induced by deposit 
insurance weakened the foundations of the financial system. Deposit insurance reduced runs on 
banks. This reduction indicates deposit insurance protected the financial system from panics, 
although the protection may have been limited, as the remaining columns suggest. 
                                                 
11  We know from Table 2 that a coinciding aggregate effect existed. Thus, when national-bank suspension rates 
rose, the number as well as the proportion of state banks suspended due to runs rose. In other words, the 
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Column (2) improves the precision of our estimates by controlling for shocks to the 
agricultural economy and crises occurring around the years when states abandoned deposit 
insurance. The results are illuminating. In states with deposit insurance, the share of suspensions 
due to runs fell, and the share of suspensions due to mismanagement rose during most years. But, 
in the penultimate year of each system, the share of suspensions due to runs increased. A panic, 
in other words, engulfed each system just before it collapsed. In the years thereafter, the share of 
suspensions due to mismanagement declined. The decline probably occurred for two reasons. 
The banking crises weeded out institutions with the weak managements, and the disappearance 
of deposit insurance increased incentives for careful management. 
Columns (3) through (6) control for excluded endogenous variables. Column (3) adds 
two new explanatory variables. One is the share of national bank suspensions due to runs. The 
other is the share of national bank suspensions due to mismanagement. The inclusion of these 
variables has little influence on the signs and magnitudes of the key coefficients. Column (4) 
adds dummy variables distinguishing calendar years. Their inclusion and interaction with other 
variables has little influence on the results. The coefficients, standard errors, and predictions 
remain roughly the same. Column (5) restricts attention to the eight states with deposit insurance 
and their immediate neighbors. Again, the results remain roughly the same. Additional 
regressions including dummy variables for regions and states (which we do not report) 
corroborate these claims. All reveal coefficients with magnitudes and directions similar to our 
previous work. Column (6) employs an instrumental variable for the log odds of the national 
suspension rate. The instrument is the same as in the preceding section. The result is also the 
same. The instrument neither alters the signs, magnitudes, nor significance levels of the other 
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explanatory variables. This invariance indicates that correlations among shocks to the national 
and state bank suspension rates do not bias our estimates. 
Table 5 summarizes our multinomial analysis. The columns correspond to the regressions 
reported in Table 4. The entries are average predicted probabilities from the system of equations 
(3´). Rows (b) and (c) correspond to the equations (3b´) and (3c´). The sub-rows (b.1) to (b.3) 
and (c.1) to (c.3) parse the predicted values into those for states without deposit insurance, for 
states with deposit insurance in all years except for the year preceding departure, and for states 
with deposit insurance in the ‘crisis’ year preceding departure. Sub-rows (b.1) and (c.1) reveal 
the composition of suspensions for the control group. Sub-rows (b.2) and (c.2) reveal the 
composition of suspensions for the treatment group. The contrast between the control and 
treatment groups reveals the impact of deposit insurance. First consider runs. In states without 
deposit insurance, runs caused approximately 9.1 percent of all suspensions. In states with 
deposit insurance, runs caused approximately 5.0 percent of all suspensions. Our approximations 
are the average of the predictions from specifications (2) through (6). Thus, deposit insurance 
reduced the share of suspensions due to runs by approximately 4.1 percent. The number of 
suspensions due to runs, in other words, declined by slightly more than 45 percent. Now consider 
mismanagement. In states without deposit insurance, mismanagement caused approximately 43.9 
percent of all suspensions. In states with deposit insurance, the share due to mismanagement rose 
to 46.7 percent. Thus, deposit insurance increased the share of suspensions due to 
mismanagement by roughly 3 percent. The number of suspensions due to mismanagement, in 
other words, increased by slightly more than 7 percent. For specifications, the magnitudes of 
these two effects were similar or statistically indistinguishable. That is why the grouped logit 
estimates in the previous section find that deposit insurance had little impact on net bank   26
suspension rates, even though the multinomial logit estimates in this section find that deposit 
insurance had a great impact on the composition of suspension. 
Figure 5, which plots predicted values from Equation (2) of Table 4, illustrates how the 
composition of bank suspensions changed before and after states abandoned deposit insurance. 
In the years preceding departure, agricultural conditions soured in each state. National bank 
suspension rates rose. State banks failed in large numbers. Suspensions due to runs rose, as did 
suspensions due to insolvency (the omitted category). Anecdotal evidence indicates that panic 
swept the banking systems in each state, as depositors foresaw the demise of the deposit 
insurance system and rushed to withdraw funds. A few years after states abandoned deposit 
insurance, the share of suspensions due to runs rose to a new level, higher than it had been under 
deposit insurance. The share suspensions due to mismanagement fell to a new level, lower than it 
had been under deposit insurance. The composition of suspensions converged towards that of 
states that never possessed deposit insurance. 
 
6. Discussion 
  Deposit insurance clearly influenced the pattern of bank suspension during the 1920s. 
Insurance reduced the share of suspensions due to runs and raised the share of suspensions due to 
mismanagement and other manifestations of moral hazard. The effects were roughly equal. Thus, 
the overall rate of bank suspensions differed little between insured and uninsured states after 
controlling for exogenous economic conditions. In the penultimate year of each deposit 
insurance system, however, the suspension rate surged, as did the share of suspensions due to 
runs and real shocks, such as declines in asset values. Several factors apparently contributed to 
the onset of these crises. Court decisions weakened the legal foundations of deposit insurance 
during the late 1920s. Small banks proliferated in states with deposit insurance. Many of those   27
banks operated in towns where the economy depended upon a single crop or industry. Droughts 
reduced crop yields. Inflows of crops from abroad reduced market prices of produce. Land 
values fell.  
Similar economic shocks afflicted the neighbors of the eight insured states. Yet, banking 
panics either did not occur or were much less pronounced in those places, suggesting that deposit 
insurance either caused or exacerbated the crises. Perhaps, panics occurred when people began to 
suspect the imminent demise of the deposit insurance systems. Possibly, the crises resulted from 
a buildup of bad debt in insured banks. The link between deposit insurance and the onset and 
propagation of financial shocks is unclear at this point in our research. Our data and methods, 
which illuminate both the influence of deposit insurance on the composition of bank suspensions 
and the correlation between deposit insurance and financial panics, are not suited towards 
answering questions concerning the causes of these crises. One possibility that we would like to 
examine is whether regulatory forbearance caused the clustering of bank suspensions during the 
last year of the system. Our essay yields more concrete conclusions on a number of important 
points. 
First, deposit insurance had positive and negative effects. The magnitude of the salutary 
effect that we measure – a decline in runs by nearly half during non-crisis years – resembles that 
claimed by our pro-insurance predecessors. The magnitude of the harmful effect that we measure 
– an increase in the share of suspensions due to mismanagement by one tenth – resembles that of 
the other studies. Our own findings as well as theirs, however, may be understated. Our category 
mismanagement consists of banks that suspended operations due to the real world manifestations 
of moral hazard, such as risk-taking, malfeasance, and incompetence. Our category 
mismanagement does not include banks whose portfolio decisions raised the risks that they faced   28
without rising to a level that examiners deemed ill advised or incompetent. Including such cases 
(if they existed) would increase our estimates. While the data do not exist, we can indirectly 
estimate an upper bound based on events that were more readily identifiable and thus less likely 
to have been undercounted. Runs were easier to observe. Examiners determined if banks suffered 
runs by examining deposit losses before bank suspensions. Our multinomial regressions reveal 
that suspensions due to runs fell at most by 5 percent of aggregate suspensions.
12 Our grouped 
logit regressions reveal that deposit insurance did not alter overall suspension rates, or in other 
words, that the decline in suspensions due to runs offset the rise in suspensions due to moral 
hazard. So, the upper bound for the rise in suspensions due to moral hazard in states with deposit 
insurance is equal to the upper bound for the decline in suspensions due to runs, which is 5 
percent.  
Second, deposit insurance influenced the composition of bank suspensions much more 
than it influenced the aggregate suspension rate. This revelation underscores an issue emphasized 
in the theoretical literature: the credibility of the insurance regime. When the regime is credible, 
the incentives of depositors and managers change, which reduces runs while inducing moral 
hazard. When the regime is not credible, neither group alters their behavior. Thus, the 
magnitudes of deposit insurance’s beneficial and detrimental effects should shift in unison. The 
net effect should remain near zero. That is what we find in our estimates. 
Third, during the 1920s, the principal causes of bank suspensions were mismanagement 
and losses due to unforeseen economic circumstances, such as dramatic declines in crop prices 
and land values after World War I. Our data sources contain innumerable examples of 
mismanagement. Some banks failed to keep accurate accounts. Some failed to balance their 
                                                 
12  This percentage is the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the average difference between 
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books. Others loaned the bulk of their assets to single firms, friends of the management, or 
businesses with little prospect of repayment. Many lacked profitable business plans. Frivolous 
expenses exceeded sustainable levels. Revenues fell far below the threshold for profits. Runs 
caused only a small proportion of bank suspensions, even during the worst downturns. 
Depositors seldom withdrew funds from solvent institutions so quickly that the institution could 
not liquidate assets, rebalance their books, and remain open to the public. Six banks failed due to 
mismanagement for every one bank that failed due to a run. Deposit insurance did not direct 
regulatory resources toward that principal problem. 
 These findings reinforce the cautionary conclusions drawn from the state deposit-
insurance experiments. Deposit insurance did not address the principal problems of the United 
States banking system during the first third of the twentieth century. Lack of managerial capital 
was a principal problem. Managers of small banks in rural areas seldom possessed extensive 
training in technical topics. Some knew neither how to nurture their institutions during good 
times nor how to protect their institutions from economic shocks. Runs were a second order 
concern. Even if the state deposit insurance systems had eliminated all bank runs without 
generating moral hazard, the overall rate of suspension would have fallen by no more than one 
tenth. 
A similar situation exists in developing nations today, which is one reason that the policy 
experiments of grain-growing states during the 1920s remains a valuable analogy for scholars 
seeking to understand the costs and benefits of deposit insurance. In developing nations, the costs 
of deposit insurance may be large. The benefits in terms of reducing bank runs may be small. 
Policy makers should carefully calibrate these benefits and costs when deciding whether to 
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establish deposit insurance systems. 
 
Methodological Appendix 
  The accuracy of estimators is always a concern. Violations of standard assumptions may 
yield estimators with undesirable properties. This appendix discusses four such issues about 
estimators.  
The first issue is the use of national bank suspension rate as a proxy for economic 
conditions influencing state banks. The national bank suspension rate is itself a function of those 
variables and a random error term. This error enters into the estimating equation for state banks 
and may affect the consistency of our estimators. Consider the equations whose estimate we 
report in Column 2 of Table 2. 
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asymptotic properties of the estimators for φ  and γ  can be calculated. To simplify the notation, 
label in the typical manner the dependent variable as y, the independent variables as X, the 
coefficients as β, and the error term as ε (our notation follows Green 2000 pp. 375-381). The 
matrix of independent variables is the sum of two components. The first consists of two vectors: 
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This notation allows (A.1) above to be rewritten in the familiar form 
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The matrices Σuu and Σuε represent the correlations of concern. Elements of the first are the 
variances and covariances of the random elements among the independent variables. In this case, 
the sole source of randomness is the error term for national banks, NSR ε . The variance of this 
error term, denoted
2
NSR σ , is the only non-zero element in Σuu. Elements of Σuε are the covariances 
between the random elements of the explanatory variables and the error term of the dependent 
variable, SSR ε . The covariance of  NSR ε and  SSR ε , denoted  NSR SSR, σ  is the only non-zero element. 
  Writing out the two elements of b from (A.4) illuminates the problem. The probability 
limit on our estimate of the coefficient on the log odds of the national bank suspension rate 
equals 
(A.5)  2 11 *
,
*11
q
q
    plim
NSR
NSR SSR
σ
σ φ
φ
+
+
=
)
   32
where q*
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inestimable, economic theory and historical circumstances suggest overestimation is the likely 
case. φ  is the ratio of  SSR φ  and  NSR φ , which should be close to or less than unity, since state 
banks failed on average at higher (and higher varying) rates than national banks, suggesting the 
former were more sensitive to changes in underlying economic conditions than the latter. 
NSR SSR, σ  is the covariance of random shocks affecting suspension rates of state and national 
banks. 
2
NSR σ  is the variance of random shocks affecting suspension rates of national banks. 
Shocks affecting state and national banks are likely to have been similar, if not the same, and 
thus highly correlated. The magnitude of the shocks affecting state banks must have been at least 
as high as the magnitude of shocks affecting national banks, since state-bank suspension rates 
varied much more than national-bank suspension rates. These facts suggest that  NSR SSR, σ  equaled 
or exceeded 
2
NSR σ , and thus, that we overestimateφ . 
   Similar logic suggests that we also overestimate the coefficient on deposit insurance. The 
second element of b from (A.4) illuminates the problem. The probability limit of γˆ equals 
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Comparing this condition to the inequality that determines the consistency of φ
)
strongly suggests   33
that γˆ overestimatesγ . We overestimateγ  in all cases where we overestimateφ  and in many 
more, since  0 2 ,
21 * > NSR SSR q σ . 
Similar algebra can be used to derive the conditions for the consistency of estimators in 
all other specifications estimated in this essay. In each case, the consistency conditions will be 
similar. The balance between over and underestimation will depend upon the relative magnitudes 
of  NSR SSR, σ  and 
2
NSR σ . Since this bias generally goes against the argument advanced in this essay, 
correcting it is not a necessity, although the correction should favor our argument by lowering 
our estimateγ  or leaving it relatively unchanged. Correcting for the bias using instrumental 
variables and the method of group averages indicates that the later is, in fact, the case (see Tables 
3, column 6 and Table 5, column 6). 
The second issue concerns the possibility that our error terms may not be independent 
across space and time. Common shocks could bias our estimated coefficients. To alleviate that 
concern, we include state, region, and time dummy variables in several specifications and/or 
limit our analysis to states adjoining, and therefore similar to, the insured states. Common shocks 
could also cause downward bias in our standard errors. We have examined this issue. The story 
is what one would expect and what typically happens in studies of this sort. The nature of the 
common shocks is not known. Assumptions must be made concerning temporal and spatial 
clustering. Under some sets of plausible assumptions, our standard errors appear accurate and 
our hypothesis tests correct after having been adjusting using the Huber-White and Newey-West 
methods. Under other sets of plausible assumptions, the standard errors grow and many variables 
that once appeared to be ‘statistically significant’ no longer appear to be so.  
In neither case do our key conclusions change. In our grouped logit regressions, the novel 
finding was that deposit insurance was uncorrelated with suspension rates, except during the   34
penultimate year of the deposit insurance system. Correcting (i.e. enlarging) our standard errors 
reinforces that result. In our multinomial logit regressions, our key conclusions concerning the 
magnitude and signs of the marginal effects, which indicate that deposit insurance reduced 
suspensions due to runs and increased suspensions due to moral hazard, are not affected by 
changes in the standard errors. 
Data Appendix  
The Committee on Branch, Group, and Chain Banking collected data on the causes of 
bank suspension using a preprinted four-page form. A reproduction of the portion pertaining to 
the information available in our database appears below.  
We calculate the dependent variables for section 3, causal state-bank suspension rates, 
using the following formulas.  
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where n equals the number of state banks in state i in year t. J equals the number of state banks 
that suspended operations in state i in year t. K equals the number of potential causes. P kj equals 
1 if cause k was a primary cause of bank j’s suspension, 0 otherwise. C kj equals 1 if cause k was 
a contributing cause of bank j’s suspension, 0 otherwise.  j λ  equals 1 divided by the number of 
primary causes for the failure of bank j.  j η  equals 1 divided by the number of contributing 
causes to the failure of bank j. α = 0.8. The set {runs on banks} consists of heavy withdrawals,   35
contagion, idle gossip, loss of confidence. The first of those causes appears on row 6 of the form 
above. The remainder appears in row 10 under the heading “other causes.” The set 
{mismanagement} consists of incompetent management, defalcation, dishonesty, carelessness 
and neglect, exploitation, forgery of notes, lax supervision, suicides. The first and second of 
those causes appear on rows 4 and 5 of the form above. The remainders appear in row 10 under 
the heading “other causes.” The set {neither} equals all causes other than those in the sets {runs} 
and {mismanagement}. 
To check the robustness of this categorization, we reran all regressions after redefining 
the variables in broader terms. To the first category, we added suspension of affiliate, suspension 
of correspondent, suspension of banks in vicinity, inability to borrow, and inability to liquidate. 
To the second category, we added forgery of notes, lax supervision, loss in investment, misuse of 
fund, outside investment, political loans, security speculation, and suicides of bank presidents. 
The third category included all banks closing due to other causes. 
While many of the terms above seem self-explanatory, their variety reflects the lack of a 
standard lexicon for the interwar banking industry. This lexical lacuna sometimes caused 
confusion, because definitions of banking terms varied across jurisdictions, year, and region. 
Each state-banking bureau published its own report and defined terms as it saw fit. Explicit 
definitions seldom appeared. Multiple definitions often existed. Some varied according to 
context. To minimize confusion, analysts at the Board of Governors strove to standardize the 
definitions of the words with which they worked and design forms that were easy to use and 
elicited accurate information. The design process was interactive and ongoing. The Board 
circulated forms to agents around the country and asked them to suggest improvements. 
Correspondence between the Board of Governors and the district banks announced up-and-  36
coming modifications and important decisions concerning the coding of ambiguous cases. A 
series of memos defined key terms and explained how to fill out the forms. The survey that we 
use was conducted at a time when the Federal Reserves lexicon was approaching its final form. 
Many definitions had solidified. 
Definitions of key terms that differ from modern parlance appear below. The definitions 
come from an internal memo on the topic entitled “Bank Changes - Definition of Terms [Federal 
Reserve Committee on Branch, Group, and Chain Banking, 5 November 1930, file 421.113-1].”  
A bank suspension occurred when a bank closed its doors “to the public either temporarily or 
permanently by supervisory authorities or by the bank’s board of directors on account of 
financial difficulties, regardless of whether or not the bank is ultimately classed as a suspension 
by the supervisory authorities [memo, 18 November 1929].” The term sprang from the phrase the 
‘suspension of payment of deposits.’ In lay terms, a bank suspended payments when a depositor 
asked to withdraw funds, and a bank refused the request. Banks could halt payments for short 
periods without officially entering suspended status. According to the official definition of the 
Federal Reserve, banks suspended payments only if they closed their doors overnight. A bank 
that closed its doors during the morning but resumed payments before the end of the business 
day was not classified as a suspended bank. A bank that closed its door at three in the afternoon 
and reopened the next morning shortly after its appointed opening time was classified as a 
suspended bank. This in-house definition resembled several vernacular terms. Suspension and 
closure sometimes served as equivalents, although the equivalence was loose. The terms were 
not synonymous. Writers used them in various senses and seldom stated explicit definitions. 
Sometimes closure meant suspension. Sometimes it meant suspension followed by bankruptcy. 
Defalcation meant a fraudulent deficiency in money matters or a monetary deficiency through   37
breach of trust by one who has the management or charge of funds. The breach of trust must 
have been a violation of the law. The most common example was embezzlement. 
Correspondents were banks with ongoing relationships facilitated by deposits of funds. A 
common situation involved a small bank outside a financial center (called a country bank) that 
deposited funds in a bank in a reserve city (called a city bank) and received services such as 
check clearing in return. Such deposits often formed a portion of country banks’ legal reserves. 
In many cases, the suspension of the city bank precipitated the suspension of the country bank, 
because the latter lost its legal reserves and linkages to the national financial system. Another 
potential cause of bank suspensions was unusually heavy withdrawals. This often meant a run on 
a bank. Rumors of financial difficulties spread among depositors. Fearing for the safety of their 
savings, they rushed to empty their accounts. Their banks lacked enough cash on hand to satisfy 
immediate demands. So, the banks suspended payments on deposits. In some instances, the term 
heavy withdrawals referred to dramatic events of this type. But, a Federal Reserve study, 
“Deposit Losses Before Suspension” by Thomas Kroll, concluded that long queues of 
despondent depositors were a symptom, rather than a cause, of most banks’ demise. The 
significant deposit losses occurred before ordinary men and women rushed to empty their 
accounts. Businesses, banks, and wealthy individuals - who possessed better-than-average 
information about financial events, multiple bank accounts, and the ability to transfer funds 
quickly via wire or check - often transferred large amounts out of banks in the weeks or months 
before ordinary individuals panicked over their accounts. Thus, the term heavy withdrawals 
usually indicated that a bank suffered the loss of many large depositors in the weeks prior to the 
suspension of payments. Researchers at the Federal Reserve called these events invisible runs. 
Our dependent variable for the estimates in Section 4, the state-bank suspension rate,   38
comes from the annual reports of the Office of Comptroller of Currency. These reports indicate 
the number of bank suspensions in each year in each state. The Comptroller of Currency 
gathered data on state bank suspensions from the regulatory reports of each state and via 
correspondence with state banking authorities. Our key independent variable, the national bank 
suspension rate also comes from the annual reports of the Office of Comptroller of Currency. 
We draw information about bank regulations from White [1983]. Data on legal reserve 
requirements comes from Table 3.3. Data on branch banking restrictions comes from Table 3.5. 
The U.S. Palmer Drought index was downloaded in April 2000 from the National 
Climatic Data Center data file number ds885.1. The Palmer drought index is a monthly data 
compile by Tom R. Karl and Red Ezell that reports monthly average temperature and 
precipitation by land stations in each state. The index ranges from -4 to +4.  A -4 indicates 
extreme aridity and +4 indicates extreme moisture. Both extremes are bad for agricultural 
growth. Values near zero are good for growth. To obtain the value of our independent variable, 
we average the monthly values for all of the weather stations in a state. Then, we square that 
amount, creating an index ranging from 0 to 16 where low values indicates good growing 
conditions and high values indicate bad growing conditions. 
Prices of agricultural products come from the Department of Agriculture’s Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1899 to 1940. The table below provides explicit citations.  
 
Crop  Years  Source / Table Title 
    
Maize  1899-1908    Average farm price of wheat per bushel in the United States 1899-
1908. Vol. 1908 pp. 602-3. 
  1909-1924  Table 71 -- Corn: Farm price per bushel, Dec 1, 1909-1924, and value 
per acre, 1924. Vol. 1924 p.611 
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Crop  Years  Source / Table Title 
    
  1925-1930  Table 53 -- Corn: Yield per acre, average 1919-1928 and annual 1925-
1930, and estimated price per bushel Dec 1, by States, averages 1924-
1928, and annual 1925-1930. Vol. 1931 p.620 
    
Oats  1899-1908  Average farm price of wheat per bushel in the United States 1899-
1908. Vol. 1908 pp.624-5 
  1909-1924  Table 93 -- Oats: Farm price per bushel, Dec 1, 1909-1924, and value 
per acre, 1924. Vol. 1924 p.627. 
  1924-1928  Table 73 -- Oats: Yield per acre, average 1919-1928 and annual 1925-
1930, and estimated price per bushel Dec 1, by States, averages 1924-
1928, and annual 1925-1930. Vol.1931 p.632. 
    
Wheat  1901-1909  Average farm price of wheat per bushel in the United States 1901-
1909. Vol. 1910 p.518 
  1910-1912  Table 16 -- Wheat: Yield per acre and price per bushel of wheat, by 
States. Yield 1910-1913, price 1910-1912. Vol. 1913 p.382. 
  1911-1915  Table 19 -- Wheat: Yield per acre, price per bushel, Dec 1, and value 
per acre, by States Yield 1905-1914, Price 1911-1915. Vol. 1914 
p.527 
  1914-1925  Table 29 -- Wheat: Estimated price per bushel, received by producers, 
Dec 1, average 1909-1913, annual 1914-1925. Vol. 1925 p.764 
  1926-1931  Table 7 -- Wheat: Yield per acre and estimated price per bushel Dec 1, 
by States, averages, and annual 1926-1931. Vol. 1932 p.583. The 1929 
value for Mississippi is missing from this data source. We replaced it 
with the $1.07, which is the average of the values for the preceding 
and following years. 
 
  
   40
 
Table 1 
Grouped logit estimates 1909-1929 
 
   Dependent variable: Log odds of state bank suspension rate 
 Coefficient 
(standard error) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  -3.25 -2.37 -2.42 -4.73 -7.38 -4.79 -3.74 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.45) (0.99) (0.43) (1.31) 
Log odds of national bank suspension rate     0.12 0.11 0.00  0.04   -0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) 
National bank suspension rate %        19.42 13.71 20.26 23.44 
       (2.19) (2.79) (2.02) (3.24) 
National bank suspension rate % squared        -38.18 -24.50 -41.12 -55.58 
      (9.36)  (11.26)  (9.01)  (14.85) 
Deposit insurance   0.38  0.11  -0.23  -0.04 -0.20  0.02  0.05 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.20) (0.33) (0.21) (0.23) 
1 year before adopting deposit insurance      -0.93  0.47  0.71  0.46   
     (1.21) (0.81) (0.80) (0.81)   
Year of adoption      -0.08  1.47 1.54 1.48   
     (0.56) (0.40) (0.43) (0.40)   
1 year after adopting deposit insurance      0.55  1.46 1.84 1.46   
     (0.76) (0.53) (0.54) (0.53)   
1 year before departing deposit insurance      0.79 0.70 1.04 0.70   
     (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12)   
Year of departure      0.30  -0.28  0.05  -0.28   
     (0.22) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)   
1 year after departing deposit insurance      0.58 0.59 0.77 0.59   
     (0.26) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19)   
Instrumental  variable        -0.01   
        ( 0 . 0 4 )   
Leads and lags for adoption of deposit insurance      x  x  x  x   
Agricultural and climatic control variables        x  x  x  x 
Year and region fixed effects        x  x  x  x 
State fixed effects          x  x  x 
State capital requirements and branch banking laws          x  x   
DI & national bank suspension rate interaction        x  x  x   
Predicted  suspension  rate  4.14% 2.84% 2.75% 2.52% 2.53% 2.60% 1.24%
Adjusted R squared  0.02 0.26  0.3 0.73 0.86 0.73 0.02 
Number  of  observations  1008 1008 1008 1008  462 1008 1008 
 
Notes: Bold face indicates significant at 0.05 level. Columns (1) to (4), (6), and (7) examine all 48 states. Column 
(5) focuses on the deposit insurance states and their neighbors: AL, AR, CO, IA, ID, KS, LA, MN, MO, MS, MT, 
ND, NE, NM, OK, OR, SD, TN, TX, WA, and WY. Average state bank suspension rate
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Table 2 
Grouped logit estimates 1921-1929 
 
   Dependent variable: Log odds of state bank suspension rate 
  Coefficient  
(standard error) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  -3.23 -2.68 -2.71 -3.27  -24.69  -3.68  0.33 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.46) (6.59) (0.45) (1.68) 
Log odds of national bank suspension     0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05   0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.02) 
National bank suspension rate %        4.05  -0.07  5.40 15.72 
        (2.09) (2.60) (1.99) (2.01) 
National bank suspension rate % squared        7.56  25.45  4.63  -33.43 
        (11.63) (13.72) (11.58) (15.33) 
Deposit insurance   0.55 0.38 0.02 -0.03 -0.86 0.00  -0.17 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.20) (0.50) (0.20) (0.40) 
3 years before departing deposit insurance      0.50  -0.08 0.19 -0.11   
      (0.23) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18)   
2 years before departing deposit insurance      0.46  0.26  0.65  0.25  
      (0.22) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17)   
1 year before departing deposit insurance      0.95 0.69 1.19 0.69   
      (0.20) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16)   
Year  of  departure      0.29 0.10 0.35 0.08   
      (0.26) (0.20) (0.26) (0.20)   
1 year after departing deposit insurance      0.16  0.59  0.34  0.61   
      (0.35) (0.27) (0.39) (0.27)   
2 years after departing deposit insurance      -0.08  0.19  -0.04  0.19   
      (0.41) (0.29) (0.42) (0.29)   
3 years after departing deposit insurance      -0.33  -0.16  -0.63  -0.10   
      (0.60) (0.44) (0.50) (0.44)   
Instrumental  variable        0.19  
        ( 0 . 0 5 )   
Agricultural and climatic control variables        x  x  x  x 
Year and region fixed effects        x  x  x  x 
State fixed effects          x     
State capital requirements and branch banking laws        x  x  x   
DI & national bank suspension rate interaction        x  x  x   
Predicted  suspension  rate  4.51% 4.23% 4.20% 4.32% 4.34% 4.30% 3.73% 
Adjusted R square  0.07 0.21 0.25 0.69 0.79 0.69 0.07 
Number  of  observations  432 432 432 432 198 432 432 
 
Notes: Bold face indicates significant at 0.05 level. Columns (1) to (4), (6), and (7) examine all 48 states. 
Column (5) focuses on the deposit insurance states and their neighbors: AL, AR, CO, IA, ID, KS, LA, MN, 
MO, MS, MT, ND, NE, NM, OK, OR, SD, TN, TX, WA, and WY. 
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Table 3 
Grouped logit predictions 
 
 (3) (4) (5)   
  
  Average Annual Suspension 
Rate (Standard Error) 
1909 to 1929    
(a) States without deposit insurance  2.64 2.44 2.53   
  (0.10) (0.22)  (0.24)   
        
(b) States with DI all years but below  2.69 2.39 2.49   
  (0.24) (0.37)  (0.38)   
        
(c) States with DI year before departure   8.05 7.90 7.26   
  (1.12) (1.75)  (1.54)   
    
1921 to 1929    
(a) States without deposit insurance  3.58 3.87 3.92   
  (0.12) (0.26)  (0.30)   
        
(b) States with DI all years but below  4.96 4.13 4.58   
  (0.29) (0.53)  (0.59)   
        
(c) States with DI year before departure   11.70 11.48 10.30   
  (0.32) (3.42)  (3.26)   
        
 
Notes: DI indicates deposit insurance. Entries are average fitted values for 
the corresponding equation and model. Columns report values obtained 
from columns (3) through (5) of Tables 1 and 2. Rows (a) through (c) 
pertain to Table 1. Rows (d) through (f) pertain to Table 2. 
   43
Table 4 
Multinomial logit estimates 1921-1929 
 
  State Bank Suspensions Due to Runs (log odds) 
  Coefficient 
 (Standard Error) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log odds of national bank suspension rate  0.08 0.07 -0.07 0.06 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.08) 
og odds of share of nat. bank suspension rate due to runs  0.02   
  (0.02)   
Log odds of share of nat. bank suspension rate due to mismanagement  0.08   
  (0.02)   
Deposit insurance  -0.37 -0.82 -0.85 -0.61 -2.72 -0.82
  (0.13) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (1.06) (0.24)
1 year before departing deposit insurance  0.66 0.72 0.34 -0.11  0.68
  (0.29) (0.28) (0.31) (0.47) (0.29)
Year of departure  0.38 0.41 -0.12  -1.58  0.40
  (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.58) (0.42)
1 year after departing deposit insurance  -0.68 -0.82 -0.17  2.06  -0.71
  (0.53) (0.53) (0.54) (0.89) (0.53)
  State Bank Suspensions Due to Mismanagement (log odds) 
Log odds of national bank suspension rate  -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08  0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
og odds of share of nat. bank suspension rate due to runs  -0.04   
  (0.01)    
og odds of share of nat. bank suspension rate due to mismanagement  0.003   
  (0.01)    
Deposit insurance  0.06 0.21 0.24 0.35  0.83  0.22
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.52) (0.10)
1 year before departing deposit insurance  -0.30 -0.38 -0.48 -0.51 -0.32
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.24) (0.15)
Year  of  departure  0.03 -0.05 -0.20 0.45 0.01
  (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.30) (0.19)
1 year after departing deposit insurance  -0.45 -0.41 -0.33 -0.06 -0.39
  (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.45) (0.26)
2
nd and 3
rd years before and after departing deposit insurance  xxx  x  x
Agricultural and climatic control variables  x x x  x  x
Year Fixed Effect    x x x
Instrumental Variable      x
 
Notes: Bold face type indicates significant at 0.05 level. Number of observations is 432 per outcome. 
Columns (1) to (3), (5), and (6) examine all 48 states. Column (4) focuses on the deposit insurance states 
and their neighbors: AL, AR, CO, IA, ID, KS, LA, MN, MO, MS, MT, ND, NE, NM, OK, OR, SD, TN, 
TX, WA, and WY. 
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Table 5 
Multinomial logit predictions 
 
    Percent of Suspensions Due to …   (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
    
    
   
(b)  Runs  7.95 8.13 8.52 9.70 8.22
   (0.86) (0.10) (0.12) (0.70)  (0.09)
     
(b.1)    In states without deposit insurance  8.29 8.50 8.93 11.35 8.57
   (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.95)  (0.10)
     
(b.2)    In states with DI all years but below  5.01 5.07 5.20 4.82 5.20
   (0.26) (0.30) (0.29) (0.40)  (0.29)
     
(b.3)    In states with DI year before departure  9.35 8.69 8.90 8.68 8.90
  (0.24) (0.55) (0.74) (0.64) (0.74)
     
       b.2 minus b.1  -3.28 -3.43 -3.73 -6.53 -3.37
     
     
(c)  Mismanagement  44.38 44.47 46.01 41.79 44.46
   (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.92)  (0.36)
     
(c.1)    In states without deposit insurance  44.28 44.35 45.99 40.64 44.40
   (0.36) (0.36) (0.39) (1.02)  (0.39)
     
(c.2)    In states with DI all years but below  46.73 47.14 46.79 46.25 46.66
   (0.64) (0.68) (0.75) (2.15)  (0.71)
     
(c.3)     In states with DI year before departure  33.54 33.45 33.60 35.50 33.60
   (1.03) (1.29) (0.99) (4.85)  (0.99)
   
       c.2 minus c.1  2.45 2.79 0.8 5.61 2.26
         
 
Note: Entries are average fitted values for the corresponding equation and model. Columns 
report values obtained from corresponding columns of Table 4. Rows (b) and (c) pertain to 
equation (3b´) and (3c´). Rows (b.1) and (c.1) indicate average fitted values for equations (3b´) 
and (3c´) for all observations for which the indicator for deposit insurance equals zero. Rows 
(b.2) and (c.2) indicate average fitted values for equations (3b´) and (3c´) for all observations for 
which the indicator for deposit insurance equals one except those for which the indicator for the 
year before departure equals one. Rows (b.3) and (c.3) indicate average fitted values for 
equations (3b´) and (3c´) for all observations for which the indicator for deposit insurance equals 
one and the indicator for the year before departure equals one. Elasticities evaluated at the means 
of the independent variables yield similar results.   45
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